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Abstract
Wireless networks are rapidly becoming
ubiquitous but are often insecure and leave users
responsible for their own security. We empirically 
study whether users are successfully securing their 
client computers when using wireless networks.
Automated techniques are used that scan users’
machines after they associate with a university 
wireless network. This determines whether a firewall 
is being used and what TCP ports are open. Results 
show that over 9% of 3,331 unique computers scanned 
were not using a properly configured firewall. In 
addition, almost 9% had at least one TCP port open, 
with almost 6% having open ports with significant 
security implications. We also found and discuss cases 
where connected computers were compromised by 
Trojan programs such as SubSeven and NetBus. We 
discuss the generalizability of our results to other 
potentially insecure wireless networks, and
suggestions for further research.
1. Introduction
Analogous to the historic growth of the Internet, 
the number of wireless local area networks (hereafter
referred to simply as wireless networks) is exploding 
with declining hardware prices and the rapid adoption 
of well-accepted standards. Using 802.11a/b/g 
standards (also known by the marketing name “Wi-
Fi”), access points are increasingly acting as bridges
for users of wireless devices to connect to wired local 
area networks and the Internet. Particularly significant 
are public access points, commonly known as 
hotspots, which are often located in heavily populated 
areas such as airports, coffee shops, hotel lobbies, and 
public areas, appealing to both business and casual 
users but offering little or no security [1]. 
By January 2006, public hotspots had already 
surpassed 100,000 worldwide, up from approximately
57,000 a year before [2]. About 8000 of these are free, 
and 92,000 charge for access (although approximately
half of the latter are in hotels and restaurants, many of 
which offer access to customers at no added charge).  
These public hotspot numbers do not include large 
numbers of ostensibly private access points in homes 
and businesses or increasing numbers of free hotspots 
provided by municipalities and other entities. The 
growth in hotspots is expected to continue in part
because they are inexpensive. For example, 
maintaining the Bryant Park Wireless Network in New 
York City and leasing its T1 backbone connection is 
said to cost less than the park spends on trash bags [3].  
Additionally, the public in general and business users 
in particular are growing accustomed to the mobility 
and ubiquitous Internet access these networks provide.
A further impetus to wireless network use is the 
increasing proportion of mobile computers. In May of 
2004 retail sales of notebook computers surpassed 
desktop computer sales for the first time [4]. Even 
with threats to data security on the rise, it is estimated 
that within the next three years 50% of all workers 
will be equipped with a laptop, even though only 10% 
of enterprises have a plan in place to manage and 
secure these devices [5]. While mobility has benefits 
in terms of employee productivity, managing this 
mobility and addressing security is an important
requirement. Recommendations include using
software solutions that track devices, enforce security 
policy, and synchronize data on the organization’s 
terms. The software segment providing mobile 
security solutions is expected to grow to $400 million 
in sales by 2009, but with a cost of $50-$100 per user 
[5]. This added cost is often burdensome for 
individuals and organizations with limited budgets. 
Computer and network security is consuming an 
increasingly larger amount of time, budgets, and other 
resources for individuals and organizations. The 
spiraling number of viruses and outsider attacks has 
driven this attention level, as has the shortened 
timeframe between vulnerability announcements and 
the appearance of global exploits. Despite this trend, 
many wireless networks and particularly public 
hotspots have little or no network security enabled. A 
recent survey conducted by Panda Software 
International determined that approximately 60% of 
all wireless networks do not use any form of 
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encryption. Of wireless networks with encryption 
enabled, approximately 75% are using the wireless 
equivalence protocol (WEP), which has several well-
documented security deficiencies [6][7][8]. The 
problem is even more acute with public hotspots 
because the users of these hotspots are interested in 
ease of use and not in the level of security employed 
[3]. Guests at hotels, for example, have reported theft 
of information from their computers while connected 
to the hotel’s wireless network [9].  With the tendency 
of wireless users to access the Internet through many 
different public access points, the chance of picking up 
malicious code is high, and these threats are easily 
transferred to wired networks to which those users 
may later connect, thus extending the implications of 
user security to network security as well.
Given the open nature of public wireless 
networks, it is clear that it is the responsibility of the 
users of these networks to provide for their own 
security [3]. Therefore our study focuses on whether 
users of wireless networks are in fact securing their
computers. There is surprisingly little quantifiable 
evidence that sheds light on this question, especially
from the perspective of wireless users.  For example, 
one study [10] examines users’ intention to practice 
security (such as employing firewalls), but does not 
consider the wireless environment and does not 
quantify the subsequent implementation of user 
firewalls. Our study specifically explores the issue of 
wireless user vulnerabilities and security practices and 
quantifies the number of wireless users who are not 
achieving an adequate level of security.  
Our goal is to directly investigate how well 
wireless users are securing their computers. Using a
university campus wireless network, we perform a 
vulnerability scan of each wireless user shortly after 
they associate to one of the campus access points, 
using Nmap to perform the scan [11]. The results of 
the Nmap scans are used to determine the proportion 
of wireless users not using a firewall and the 
proportion of users with open ports. In particular, our
study focuses on open ports with well known security 
implications [12] [13] [21] [22]. The specific research 
questions addressed are: 
1. What is the percentage of wireless network 
users not using a firewall?
2. What is the percentage of wireless network 
users with detectable open ports?
3. Do open ports tend to be those with significant 
security issues?
The following section describes our methodology, 
including our subjects, the wireless network studied, 
data collection, firewall detection, and port-related 
vulnerabilities. Section 3 discusses our empirical 
results and relates these results to the research 
questions listed above. Finally, section 4 concludes by 
summarizing our findings, addressing the study’s 
generalizability and limitations, and suggesting future 
research topics.
2. Methodology
2.1 Subjects
Subjects for the study are all authorized users of a
campus wireless network. This potentially includes 
18,599 students, approximately 1000 faculty and staff, 
and a variable number of visitors using the network. 
The university is a commuter campus with relatively 
non-traditional students and has 15,779 undergraduate 
students (average age 26) and 1663 graduate students 
(average age 36). The gender percentages are 54% 
female and 45% male (1% unspecified). Most students 
live off campus, and many have part-time jobs or full-
time careers, often with one of several local high-tech 
firms. We view the non-traditional nature of the 
student subjects as a positive factor for the study as we 
believe it makes them more representative of the 
general public and workforce than traditional students 
would be.
It is possible that some wireless users on campus 
were not included in the study because they did not 
connect to an official campus access point, but instead 
connected to a “rogue” access point installed by a 
student in a dorm room, etc. While campus network 
administrators regularly detect and remove these rogue 
access points, they continue to come and go. From 
what can be observed over time, this is a very small 
minority of access points and users.
2.2 The Wireless Network
The wireless network uses approximately 80 
Cisco 1200 wireless access points spread throughout a 
175-acre campus. Most high-demand areas are 
covered, as evidenced by infrequent responses to a 
web form inviting users to report areas of missing 
coverage or poor signal strength.
Wireless user authentication is done using a web-
based challenge-response system interfacing with the 
campus LDAP server and using the same single sign-
on directory that authenticates users for the campus 
intranet and email systems. Once a user is 
authenticated, the MAC address for the network card
installed on the user’s computer is registered with the 
wireless network, allowing each authenticated 
machine to use the wireless network for a period of 
several days before the user is required to re-
authenticate. This means that once a user has 
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authenticated a computer with the wireless network,
anyone with access to the authenticated machine has 
access to the wireless network until the authenticated 
period expires.
Wireless traffic on campus is segregated through 
the use of separate virtual local area network segments
(VLANs) and IP subnets, and filtered through 
firewalls before reaching the campus internal network 
or the Internet.  The wireless traffic is also managed 
through a traffic shaping device. However, other than 
the MAC-level access control described in the 
previous paragraph, there are no security measures in 
place on the wireless network itself. No encryption 
(e.g., WEP) is used over the wireless link, and users 
desiring additional security must use Virtual Private 
Networking (VPN), Secure Shell (SSH), or other 
measures not directly provided by the wireless 
network. While future plans call for automated 
vulnerability assessments that force users to prove that 
they have installed required operating system updates 
and anti-virus software, these security measures had
not yet been implemented at the time of our study.  
We believe that this environment of minimal network-
level security and heavy reliance on user security 
makes the campus wireless network reasonably 
representative of public hotspot-based wireless 
networks in general.
2.3 Data Collection
Data collection was performed continuously 
during a 41-day period from April 27 to June 7, 2006.  
During that time 3,331 unique, non-university 
managed computers connected to the wireless 
network. The data collection process consisted of two 
main components:
1. User/client machine detection: A
continuously running script polled the entire set of
access points to retrieve a list of associated user 
machines.
2. User vulnerability scans: For each associated 
user machine that had not been previously scanned, a 
vulnerability scan was performed using Nmap.
User detection was performed with a Perl script
using Net-SNMP [14] and SNMP (Simple Network 
Management Protocol) [15]. The script visited each 
access point in a continuous loop 24 hours a day, 
collecting a list of IP and MAC addresses of 
associated computers. After the set of associated
computers is passed to the user vulnerability scan, the 
next set is collected. However, before a specific 
computer is scanned its MAC address is compared to 
the MAC addresses already stored in the database. If 
the MAC address is found, the computer is not 
scanned. In other words, each computer is scanned 
exactly one time, regardless of how often it connected 
to the wireless network during the data collection 
period.  The study was constructed in this manner in 
part to minimize any additional load placed on the 
wireless network and its users by the study.
Where we were able to identify wireless client 
machines as university-owned and maintained devices, 
we removed these from the analysis because security 
precautions for these computers are largely outside the 
control of their users.  The number of devices so 
identified was 30, which is less that 1% of the total 
number of machines studied.  It is quite possible that 
we were unable to identify every university-owned 
machine, but we have reasonable confidence that any 
left mis-identified constitute a very small percentage 
of the total studied and thus would not significantly 
affect our results.
User vulnerability scans were performed using 
Nmap [11]. This tool has been used by other 
vulnerability analysis researchers, who note that port 
scanning has long been used by computer security 
analysts and Nmap is an efficient and effective tool for 
this purpose [16]. The output of the Nmap scan was
parsed and relevant data was entered into MySQL 
database tables. This data was then used to determine 
the percentage of wireless network users who: (1) do 
not have a firewall; and (2) have open ports that may 
have security implications as discussed later.
Nmap was used in verbose and aggressive mode 
(nmap –v –A <ip_add>). This enables Nmap to 
provide additional information, including information 
concerning the service (application) listening to a port. 
In addition, we used Nmap’s default port scanning 
settings, which is to scan the first 1024 TCP ports as 
well as the higher numbered ports listed in Nmap’s 
nmap-services database. The nmap-services database
includes contributions from Nmap users world wide 
and contains a reasonably complete list of services and 
the ports they use. This also enables Nmap to use its
nmap-services-probe database, which contains probes 
Nmap can use to verify the identity of a specific 
service located at a specific port [17]. This resulted in 
a total of 1663 TCP ports being scanned for each 
connected computer.
2.4 Firewall Detection
For the TCP ports scanned in this study, Nmap 
reports the specific status of ports where a service was 
detected. Nmap then reports the status of all the 
remaining ports that were scanned but did not have a 
service present. The status of each remaining port is 
either closed, which means that the port is accessible, 
but there is no application listening to the port, or 
filtered, which means that Nmap could not determine 
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if a port was open because packet filtering was 
preventing Nmap’s probes from reaching the port.  
This provided the basis for our decision rule to 
determine if a specific computer was using a firewall.
If the ports with no detectible application listening 
were closed, then the decision was that the computer 
was not using a properly configured firewall. If the 
ports with no detectible application were filtered, then 
the decision was that the computer was using a 
properly configured firewall. Note that we use firewall 
as a general term for a number of possible filtering 
mechanisms that could be present, including both 
hardware and software-based firewalls. These decision 
rules are summarized in Figure 1 below.
StatusÆ open closed filtered
All Ports 
with no 
detectable
service
present
N/A
Decision:
no
firewall
present
Decision:
firewall
present
Any port 
with a 
detectable
service
present
Decision:
Possible
security
vulnerability
N/A N/A
Figure 1. Port scan interpretations
We validated our firewall detection methods by 
scanning machines with known security
configurations. Using two software-based firewalls 
among the most popular with wireless laptop users 
(the Windows XP built-in firewall and the third-party 
Zone Alarm personal firewall), we turned firewall 
features on and off before associating to the wireless 
network, followed by scanning the machines to 
confirm that the firewall status was properly detected.  
In every test case the scanning process and our 
decision rules correctly determined the firewall status.
2.5 TCP Port-Related Vulnerabilities
Many user security vulnerabilities are related to 
TCP ports either left open inadvertently or deliberately 
enabled and used by insecure applications. Any open
port is a potential security issue, and of particular 
interest is the set of ports with generally agreed-upon 
security implications. The following discussion of port 
vulnerabilities relies, to a large extent, on material 
provided by Berghel and Hoelzer in [12].  
TCP ports 135, 137, 138, and 139 in the Windows 
environment are used by the legacy NetBIOS API for 
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) communication, while 
TCP port 445 is the Server Message Block (SMB) 
port. These ports allow file and print sharing in the 
windows environment (among other things). They also 
allow file and print sharing with Unix/Linux platforms 
through SAMBA. All of these ports can allow null 
session connections by remote machines, in effect 
opening up the computer’s hard disk to external 
access.
RPC vulnerabilities also extend to other ports.  
With many Internet service providers filtering port 
135, ports 1026 through 1029 are being targeted with 
Windows Messenger pop-up spam, which is an RPC 
service. It is generally suggested that if Windows 
Messenger is not needed, ports 1026 through 1029 
should be blocked.
Another Windows based vulnerable port related to 
NetBIOS is TCP port 42, which is the Windows 
Internet Naming Service (WINS). WINS maintains 
translation tables from NetBIOS Names to IP 
addresses for computers that share resources. It is 
possible for hackers to insert a corrupted table into the 
system, thereby directing computers to hacker 
controlled computers in a manner similar to ARP 
poisoning. In the latter case, a false MAC addresses is 
inserted into a frame to impersonate trusted network 
devices.
The Windows Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) 
port (TCP port 3389) is also of note. This protocol 
provides remote access to Windows based computers.  
RDP has been shown to be susceptible to denial-of-
service attacks. While this particular vulnerability has 
been patched, RDP has been prone to attack for 
several years and most security exports suggest that 
the port be blocked.
In both the Windows and Unix/Linux
environments, ports 20 and 21 (FTP), port 23 (Telnet), 
and port 25 (SMTP) should all be blocked. All of these 
ports have well known security issues and are prone to 
stack overflow attacks and brute force authentication 
and password guessing attempts. In addition, port 22 
(SSH) has the same vulnerabilities as the previously 
mentioned ports and has the potential for an attacker to 
create an encrypted session.
The Rlogin service (port 513) and the finger 
service (port 79) should also be blocked. Rlogin is 
used for remote access in the Unix/Linux
environment. Most security experts suggest that SSH 
be used instead because of its encryption and stronger 
authentication. The finger service allows remote 
querying of a system for the usernames of individuals 
currently logged on. This gives potential hackers half 
of the username/password equation.
The LDAP service ports (TCP ports 389, 636, 
3268, and 3269) should also be blocked. LDAP is a 
directory service used to lookup information such as 
usernames, passwords, email addresses, etc. It is 
possible, depending on how the information is stored, 
Proceedings of the 40th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences - 2007
4
Proceedings of the 40th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS'07)
0-7695-2755-8/07 $20.00  © 2007
Authorized licensed use limited to: Boise State University. Downloaded on April 24, 2009 at 16:30 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
for a hacker to query the LDAP services and recover 
information.
A problematic windows service is UPnP 
(Universal Plug and Play), which is located on port 
5000.  This service has been plagued by buffer 
overflow and denial of service attacks for several 
years.  In December 2001 the FBI urged consumers to 
disable the UPnP service because the threat was so 
significant [13].  Since then, Microsoft has patched 
UPnP several times, mitigating the threat.  However, 
many security experts still consider UPnP to be a 
security threat and suggest disabling the service and/or 
blocking port 5000 [13].
It is also interesting to note the presence of ports 
427 and 548. Port 427 is the port that the slp daemon 
listens to on Apple systems. The slp daemon 
advertises local services to the network, and is known 
to have security issues [21]. Port 548 is the port 
afpovertcp listens to. The afpovertcp service 
implements the Apple Filing Protocol, which enables 
file sharing on an Apple system over TCP 
connections. This service has many of the same 
security issues that plague the windows file sharing 
services and is very dangerous to leave unblocked
[22].
3. Results and Discussion
In general, security experts agree that the most 
important step users of wireless networks can take to 
protect themselves from other wireless users is to use a 
properly configured firewall. This is relatively easy 
and inexpensive to do because of firewall software 
built into Windows XP [18] or available free from 
third parties [19], including open source alternatives 
for Linux [20]. To address research question 1, “What
is the percentage of wireless network users not using a 
firewall?,” we looked at the status reported by Nmap 
for the TCP ports that did not have a detectible service 
installed, as described in Figure 1. We found that 
9.13% of the 3,331 computers scanned were not using 
a properly configured firewall, as shown in Table 1.
Table1. Summary of Results
Research
Question
Results
9.13% of the wireless network users 
were not using a properly configured 
firewall (304 out of 3,331 total users).  
1. What is 
the
percentage 
of wireless 
network
users not 
using a 
firewall?
90.87% of the wireless network users 
were using a properly configured 
firewall (3,027 out of 3,331 total users).
8.62% of the wireless network users did 
have detectable open ports (287 out of 
3,331 total users).
2. What is 
the
percentage 
of wireless 
network
users with 
detectable 
open ports?
91.38% of the wireless network users 
did not have detectable open ports 
(3,044 out of 3,331 total users).
Of the 287 users with detectable open 
ports, 189 (or 65.85%) had at least one 
open port with significant security 
implications.
3. Do open 
ports tend 
to be those 
with
significant
security
issues?
Of the 287 users with detectable open 
ports, 98 (or 34.15%) had no open ports 
with significant security implications.
Even with a firewall, wireless network users can 
have detectable open ports. An open port means that 
Nmap was able to determine that an application is 
accepting TCP packets from that port. Since any open 
port is a potential security risk, the second research 
question we examined was “What is the percentage of 
wireless network users with detectable open ports?.”
In our study, 8.62% of the 3,331 computers scanned 
had at least one detectable open port, as shown in 
Table 1.
Table 2 shows the frequency of open ports found 
in our scans, ordered by decreasing frequency. As 
discussed in the previous section, some ports are more 
dangerous than others to leave open. This leads to the 
third research question “Do open ports tend to be 
those with significant security issues?.” Table 2
shows, in the second column, ports having a notable 
security issue. Shaded rows indicate a port with 
notable security issues and where we found at least 
one client with that port open. We found that 5.67% of 
the wireless users had at least one of these dangerous 
ports open and accepting TCP packets (see Table 1).
See section 2.5 above for a discussion of each port’s
significance.
Table 2. Results from Nmap port scans
TCP Port
Number(s)
Notable
Security
Issue
Common 
Services
Percent
Open
139 Yes
Microsoft File 
and Print 
Sharing; Unix 
SAMBA
4.0%
135 Yes
Microsoft RPC 
Server
3.3%
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445 Yes
Microsoft File 
and Print 
Sharing; Unix 
SAMBA
3.3%
3689
Rendezvous
(Apple iTunes)
2.2%
427 Yes Apple slpd 1.6%
1025 msrpc 1.3%
548 Yes
Apple
afpovertcp
1.1%
5000 Yes
Universal Plug 
and Play
0.8%
80 Yes
HTTP Web 
Server
0.8%
1761 landesk-rc 0.7%
22 Yes Secure Shell 0.5%
3389 Yes
Windows 
Remote
Desktop
Protocol (RDP)
0.4%
21 Yes FTP 0.4%
25 Yes SMTP 0.1%
1026 Yes
Microsoft RPC 
Server
0.1%
389 Yes LDAP Service 0.06%
1027, 1028, 
1029
Yes
Microsoft RPC 
Server
0%
20 Yes FTP 0%
23 Yes Telnet 0%
42 Yes WINS Server 0%
79 Yes Finger Server 0%
137 Yes
Microsoft File 
and Print 
Sharing; Unix 
SAMBA
0%
138 Yes
Microsoft File 
and Print 
Sharing; Unix 
SAMBA
0%
513 Yes Rlogin 0%
636 Yes LDAP Service 0%
3268 Yes LDAP Service 0%
3269 Yes LDAP Service 0%
8080 Yes HTTP Proxy 0%
As can be seen in Table 2, the most frequently 
open ports are also some of the most dangerous. The 
top three open ports (in order 139, 445, and 135) are 
all dangerous and were discussed in section 2.5. 
We also noticed the presence on the wireless 
network of several computers that were infected with 
various malware applications. A total of 17 computers 
(0.5% of the computers scanned) had at least one 
malware application installed. Although a small 
number relative to the total number of wireless users, 
the existence of malware is an important finding 
because such infected machines may be used to launch 
attacks against the much larger client population. A 
complete list of the malware found and the number of 
infected computers detected is presented in Table 3.  
Table 3. Malware found
Name Description
Number 
of Users 
Infected
NetBus
Very similar to Back 
Orifice.  Allows for a 
computer to be 
controlled remotely 
without a client (from 
IRC).  Online keystroke 
logging
9
qaz
A worm application that 
provides a backdoor into 
a system.
6
Kuang2
Provides a backdoor into 
a system.  Also captures 
passwords.
5
Back Orifice 
2000 (bo2k)
Allows for a computer 
to be controlled 
remotely without a 
client (from IRC).
Online keystroke 
logging.
4
Elite on port 
31337
Nmap uses Elite for 
anything it finds running 
on port 31337, which is 
a well known Trojan 
port.  Most likely Trojan 
is Back Orifice
4
Trinoo 
Master
Server application used 
to simultaneously 
control many 
compromised
computers.  Most often 
used to begin and 
manage denial of service 
attacks.
2
SubSeven
Allows for a computer 
to be controlled 
remotely without a 
client (from IRC).
Online keystroke 
logging.
2
A more detailed description of each malware 
application can be found at [23]. Note that many of the
infected computers had multiple malware applications 
present. Of particular interest (and somewhat 
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alarming) is the presence on many of the compromised 
computers of network monitoring and packet sniffing 
applications. Of the 17 infected computers, 12 also 
had at least one network monitoring/packet sniffing 
application. The most common network monitoring 
tools found were nessus, bigbrother, and netsaint. 
4. Conclusions
4.1 Summary of findings
Our results indicate that a small but significant 
number of wireless network users are not using a 
firewall (9.13%) and/or have detectable open ports 
(8.62%), some of which have important security 
implications. The study also found that the ports most 
often left open were also the ports with the most 
serious security implications (see Table 1). When a 
machine had any ports open, there was a greater than 
65% chance that one or more of those ports had 
significant security implications.
Of additional note are the 17 computers that have 
been compromised by various forms of malware. Also 
disturbing was the presence on these compromised 
machines of network monitoring tools such as nessus. 
This opens up the possibility of these infected 
computers not only being used to infect other 
unprotected computers on the network, but to also act 
as packet sniffers and to launch other forms of attack 
such as ARP poisoning and man-in-the-middle attacks.
Wireless users are particularly vulnerable to man-in-
the-middle attacks in which a hacker, using a 
computer, emulates a rogue access point with the 
specific intent of capturing log-in credentials. 
4.2 Generalizability
The campus wireless network we studied shares 
many similarities with public hotspots—both free and 
fee-based. The network employs no form of security 
other than simple authentication and subsequent 
MAC-level access control. There were no enforced 
policies requiring users to employ security measures 
such as firewalls. Therefore, this study provides 
insight into the behavior of open wireless network 
users concerning their security precautions.
The campus user population is reasonably similar 
to the general public because of the large number of 
part-time and non-traditional students. These users 
connect to the wireless network with a variety of 
personal and employer-owned laptop computers, and 
perform a variety of tasks including personal, school-
related, and work-related activities. If anything, 
because of security awareness and guidance provided 
by the university and their employers, they may be 
somewhat more security conscious than the general 
public, possibly understating the average wireless 
network user’s vulnerability.
The methods we used may be replicated in a 
number of different wireless environments. As long as 
wireless access points support the SNMP protocol (as 
do most) and can be queried for information about 
associated users, user/client machine detection is 
feasible. Similarly, our user vulnerability scans rely 
only on the ability to probe client machines by IP 
address—a capability that should be available on any 
network with appropriate security permissions. Thus 
the same basic methodology can be applied to study 
additional wireless networks, whether they be open or 
closed, public or private.  Our methodology also
provides a reasonably general method for conducting 
wireless security audits.
4.3 Limitations
Although we scanned every client computer that 
accessed the campus wireless network during a 41-day 
period, there might be a small number of users 
undetected by this process. The majority of these are 
expected to be users who deliberately or inadvertently 
associated with ephemeral and unauthorized rogue 
access points. We estimate this number to be a very 
small percentage of the total users.
The vulnerability analysis we conducted is 
heavily dependent on TCP port scans. There are a 
lesser number of vulnerabilities associated with UDP 
ports, such as SNMP port 161, which we did not test.  
We also did not probe deeper than the port response 
level—e.g., if port 80 responded we did not then issue 
HTTP requests to that port to determine whether 
application-level authentication was in place that 
could provide some protection to the user. Of course,
there are a host of other security-related issues that 
affect users and are outside the scope of this research, 
including privacy/anonymity, viruses, and spyware.
4.4 Future research
This study quantified a small but significant 
number of wireless network users not properly 
protecting themselves by using a properly configured 
firewall. It similarly identified a number of important 
vulnerabilities at the TCP port level that significantly 
compromises user security. Additional research is 
needed in other public and private wireless networks 
to confirm the broader applicability of these findings.
The present study addresses only one element in a 
larger constellation of wireless user security awareness 
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and behavior questions, i.e., user security measures 
actually implemented at one point in time. Several 
other questions concerning knowledge, beliefs, and 
education/training effects need to be studied. 
Examples of specific questions include:
1. How knowledgeable are users about the 
specific vulnerabilities that exist on their computers?
2. How important do users believe firewalls and 
other security measures are to them personally? 
3. If users are educated about wireless network
vulnerabilities and offered training in how to mitigate 
them, how will their behaviors change over time?
  Further research in this stream will investigate 
questions such as those above, as well as study 
emerging wireless networking threats.
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